

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

XAVIER JIMÉNEZ-BENCEVÍ,

Defendant.

Civil No. 12-221 (JAF)

**MEMORANDUM ORDER**

Xavier Jiménez-Benceví was indicted on one count of murdering Delia Sánchez-Sánchez, a federal witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). (Indictment, Docket No. 11.) The government moves in limine to admit statements made by Sánchez-Sánchez during its case-in-chief. (Docket No. 311.) Jiménez-Benceví opposes. (Docket No. 353.) We grant the government's motion.

**I.**

**Background**

The Superseding Indictment alleges that Jiménez-Benceví knew that Delia Sánchez-Sánchez was a federal witness and that he killed Sánchez-Sánchez in order to prevent her from providing information to law enforcement about his criminal drug enterprise. (Docket No. 160.) On March 6, 2013, the Government filed a motion in limine to admit out-of-court statements Sánchez-Sánchez made to associates of Jiménez-Benceví and to law enforcement, including to a U.S. Probation officer and two undercover FBI agents. (Docket

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1 No. 374 at 1-2.) Jiménez-Benceví filed a response to the government's motion, requesting a  
2 pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the proposed evidence pursuant  
3 to Rules 104(a) and 804(b)(6). (Docket No. 353 at 5-6.) The Government filed a response  
4 to Jiménez-Benceví's motion, requesting a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of Sánchez-  
5 Sánchez's statements arguing that, since Jiménez-Benceví had procured Sánchez-Sánchez's  
6 unavailability, he had waived his confrontation rights and hearsay objections to Sánchez-  
7 Sánchez's statements. (Docket Nos. 374, 418.)

## 8 II.

### 9 Legal Standard

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11  
12 The Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the opportunity "to be  
13 confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This means  
14 testimonial hearsay is not admissible unless two conditions are met: The declarant is  
15 unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the  
16 declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). Forfeiture by wrongdoing,  
17 however, is an exception to this rule. Thus, testimonial hearsay is admissible "where the  
18 defendant ha[s] engaged in wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness'  
19 testimony." Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366 (2008). See also, Davis v. Washington,  
20 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) ("[O]ne who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing  
21 forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation."); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ("The rule of  
22 forfeiture by wrongdoing ... extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable  
23 grounds."); United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Forfeiture  
24 by wrongdoing is an independent ground for the admissibility of hearsay testimony.").



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1 Benceví's drug trafficking activities, which means that he had insight into Sanchez-  
2 Sanchez's willingness to testify to authorities against him. (Docket 405 at 3.)

3 **B. Pretrial Hearing is Not Required to Determine Whether the Forfeiture by**  
4 **Wrongdoing Exception Applies**

5  
6 Jiménez-Benceví asserts that the government must prove that the forfeiture by  
7 wrongdoing exception applies at a pretrial evidentiary hearing before the statements can be  
8 introduced at trial. (Docket No. 353 at 6.) We disagree.

9 We are not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding to permit the  
10 admission of these statements at trial. See United States v. Baskerville, 448 F. App'x 243,  
11 250 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011) (District Court's decision to forgo a "mini-trial" on admissibility of  
12 murdered witness' statements was reasonable); United States v. Savage, 2013 WL 372947  
13 (E.D.Pa., Jan. 31, 2013) (not necessary to hold pretrial evidentiary hearing to prove that the  
14 forfeiture by wrongdoing exception applies).

15 We requested a proffer from the Government to demonstrate that Sánchez-Sánchez's  
16 statements should be admitted subject to a proper foundation being laid at trial. In response,  
17 the Government named several witnesses who would offer evidence that Jiménez-  
18 Benceví sought to murder Sánchez-Sánchez to prevent her from communicating with law  
19 enforcement about his drug enterprise. The evidence proffered includes statements made by  
20 (1) United States Probation Officer Luz E. Aponte that Sánchez-Sánchez identified  
21 Jiménez-Benceví as the owner of a drug enterprise; (2) Gloria Albino-Figueroa and Ronnie  
22 Pérez-Albino about a recording Jiménez-Benceví played of Sánchez-Sánchez discussing her  
23 plans to inform federal agents of Jiménez-Benceví's drug enterprise; (3) Carmen Fernández-

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1 Ortega (a.k.a. “Tata”), who heard Sánchez-Sánchez say she was going to identify Jiménez-  
2 Benceví to law enforcement.

3 An evidentiary hearing may have been necessary if the government’s proffer had  
4 given reason to doubt its ability to establish at trial (1) the applicability of the forfeiture by  
5 wrongdoing exception or (2) the proper foundation for the admissibility of the statements.  
6 However, we are satisfied that the government’s proffer is sufficient to justify forgoing a  
7 pretrial hearing and admitting Sánchez-Sánchez’s statements at trial subject to later  
8 connection by the Government under Rule 804(b)(6). Given the substance and extent of the  
9 government’s proffer, a hearing would be an impractical and inefficient waste of judicial  
10 resources. United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that a pretrial  
11 hearing “would have been wasteful of judicial time, as the hearing and trial testimony on the  
12 murder would have been largely duplicative”). Sánchez-Sánchez’s statements will be  
13 admitted if the Government offers sufficient evidence at trial to ultimately support the  
14 application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception. See United States v. Benedetti, 433  
15 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2005) (“It is settled law that in limine rulings are provisional. Such  
16 ‘rulings are not binding on the trial judge [who] may always change his mind during the  
17 course of a trial.’”) (citation omitted); United States v. Marino, 200 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir.  
18 1999) (“[R]ulings on motions *in limine* normally are considered provisional, in the sense  
19 that the trial court may revisit its pretrial evidentiary rulings ... when an evidentiary proffer  
20 may be more accurately assessed in the context of the government’s other evidence.”).

**III.****Conclusion**

A defendant who has removed an adverse witness is not well-positioned to complain about losing the chance to confront that witness. Admitting a prospective witness' prior statements under circumstances such as these at least partially offsets the rewards that the defendant gained through misconduct.

Accordingly, we deny Jiménez-Benceví's request to preclude the statements made by Sánchez-Sánchez to United States Probation Officer Luz E. Aponte, Gloria Albino-Figueroa, Ronnie Pérez-Albino, and Carmen Fernández-Ortega. We also deny Jiménez-Benceví's request for the court to hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of Sánchez-Sánchez's statements. We grant the Government's request to admit the statements made by Sánchez-Sánchez at trial; however, we do so conditionally, subject to the government offering sufficient proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Jiménez-Benceví wrongfully intended to, and did, procure Sánchez-Sánchez's unavailability.

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby **GRANT** the government's motion.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 5th day of April 2013.

s/José Antonio Fusté  
JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE  
United States District Judge